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ABSTRACT
Monte Carlo Tree Search (MCTS) has been extended to many imper-
fect information games. However, due to the added complexity that
uncertainty introduces, these adaptations have not reached the same
level of practical success as their perfect information counterparts.
In this paper we consider the development of agents that perform
well against humans in imperfect information games with partially
observable actions. We introduce the Semi-Determinized-MCTS
(SDMCTS), a variant of the Information Set MCTS algorithm (ISM-
CTS). More specifically, SDMCTS generates a predictive model of
the unobservable portion of the opponent’s actions from historical be-
havioral data. Next, SDMCTS performs simulations on an instance
of the game where the unobservable portion of the opponent’s ac-
tions are determined. Thereby, it facilitates the use of the predictive
model in order to decrease uncertainty. We present an implemen-
tation of the SDMCTS applied to the Cheat Game, a well-known
card game, with partially observable (and often deceptive) actions.
Results from experiments with 120 subjects playing a head-to-head
Cheat Game against our SDMCTS agents suggest that SDMCTS
performs well against humans, and its performance improves as the
predictive model’s accuracy increases.
1 INTRODUCTION
Monte Carlo Tree Search (MCTS) has had significant success in
perfect information games such as Scrabble and Hex [1, 31] and
most noticeably in computer Go [13, 14, 32]. In recent years, MCTS
was adapted by researchers [3] to solve imperfect information games.
However, due to the added complexity that uncertainty introduces,
these adaptations have not reached the same level of practical suc-
cess as their perfect information counterparts. This paper focuses on
developing agents that can play well against humans in imperfect in-
formation games by applying learning models to reduce uncertainty.
More specifically, we focus on predicting the unobservable portion
of the human opponent’s actions and combining the prediction into
our novel MCTS adaptation.
One of the first popular extensions of MCTS to imperfect informa-
tion games is a MCTS variation where a perfect information search
is performed on a determinized instance of the game [2, 16, 31, 33].
That is, the search is performed on an instance of the game where
hidden information is revealed to the players, thereby transforming
the imperfect information game to a perfect information game. This
approach allows the deployment of a predictive model. However,
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several problems have been reported when applying determiniza-
tion which prevent the convergence to an optimal strategy such as
Strategy Fusion as discussed later in section "Determinization" [26].
To address these problems, Information set MCTS, a new family
of MCTS adaptations, were developed [6, 18, 22]. ISMCTS and its
variants perform MCTS simulations directly on information sets. An
information set is a set of game states that are indistinguishable by
the player at a given stage of the game. However, ISMCTS assumes
that every game state in the information set has the same probability
of being the game state which is not always the case. Thus, it prevents
the use of a predictive model.
This paper proposes a method for the development of agents play-
ing against humans in imperfect information games and partially
observable actions. We introduce the Semi-Determinized-MCTS
(SDMCTS), a variant of the Information Set MCTS algorithm (ISM-
CTS) combined with a determinization technique to take advantage
of the benefits of both approaches. SDMCTS is designed to re-
duce uncertainty by utilizing a predictive model of the unobservable
portion of the opponent’s actions. Similar to ISMCTS, SDMCTS
performs simulations directly on information sets with one important
distinction. The SDMCTS performs simulations on an instance of
the game where the unobservable portion of the opponent’s actions
are determined. The opponent’s actions are determined while keep-
ing the remaining unobservable information hidden (e.g. opponent’s
cards). Thereby, it preserves the advantages of ISMCTS (i.e. reduce
Strategy Fusion) while facilitating the use of the predictive model
for decreasing uncertainty with regards to hidden actions.
We evaluate the SDMCTS in Cheat Game, a well-known card
game. The players’ goal in Cheat Game (also known as Bullshit and
I Doubt It) is to discard the initially dealt cards. At each turn, a player
may discard several cards and declare their rank. However, the cards
are placed facedown and the player is allowed to lie about their rank.
Thereby, the action is only partially observable by the opponents.
For the development of the SDMCTS agents, a behavioural-based
predictive model of human player actions in the Cheat Game was
used. The predictive model was trained on data collected from 60
players playing human-vs-human games reaching 0.821 Area Un-
der the Curve (AUC). In the evaluation experiments, the SDMCTS
agents played head-to-head cheat games against 120 human sub-
jects. The results suggest that the SDMCTS agent performs well
against humans, reaching a win ratio of 88.97%. Furthermore, its
performances improve as the predictive model’s accuracy increases.
To conclude, the main novelties of this paper are: First, we present
SDMCTS, an algorithm for combining prediction of human deci-
sions with ISMCTS. Second, we introduce the Cheat Game as a
test-bed for imperfect information games with partially observable
actions. In addition, we present a highly efficient SDMCTS agent
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that performs well against humans and can run on a standard PC.
Furthermore, we present a behavioral based prediction model of hu-
man decisions in the Cheat Game with 0.821 AUC accuracy. Lastly,
experimental results demonstrate the skillful performance of the
SDMCTS approach.
2 BACKGROUND AND RELATEDWORK
2.1 Extensive-Form Games
In this section a brief overview of the game tree representation and
its formal notation are presented. An extensive-form game is a tree-
based representation of a sequential interaction of multiple fully
rational players. The set of players is denoted by N = {1, ...,n}. In
addition, a special player commonly called Chance is denoted by
c which has a probability distribution over its actions. The set of
all possible game states is denoted by S. Each s ∈ S corresponds
to a tree node in the game tree representation. A reward function
R : S → ℜn maps the terminal states to the corresponding payoff
vector where R(s)i is player i’s payoff. Each player’s goal is to
maximize his payoff in the game. The function P : S → N ∪ {c}
returns the player that is allowed to act in that state. The set of all
available actions to player P(s) is denoted by A(s). Each action
a ∈ A(s) corresponds to an edge from the current state s to a
successor state. As mentioned above, in imperfect information games
the game state is not fully observable by the players. The Information
State ui ∈ Ui is the observable portion of a game state s for player
i. Thereby, the Information Function is defined as Ii : S → Ui .
It is important to note that in cases where multiple game states are
indistinguishable by the player, the game states will be mapped to
the same information state. Therefore, the set of indistinguishable
game states that corresponds to an information state ui is denoted
by I−1(ui ) = {s | I(s) = ui }.
The behavioural strategy of player i, denoted by
π i (u) ∈ ∆(A(u)),∀u ∈ U i
, is a probability distribution over the set of available action A(ui ).
Πi denotes the set set of all behavioural strategies of player i. Fur-
thermore, a strategy profile π = (π 1, ...,πn ) is the set of all players’
strategies. π−i denotes all strategies in π except π i . The expected
payoff of player i where all players follow strategy profile π is de-
noted by Ri (π ). A strategy π i is said to be best response if for a
given fixed strategy profile π−i , Ri (π−i ∪ π i ) is optimal. A Nash
equilibrium is a strategy profile π such that for each player i ∈ N ,
the strategy π i ∈ π is best response to π−i .
2.2 Monte Carlo Tree Search
MCTS [5] is a simulation-based search algorithm for finding opti-
mal strategies. The algorithm was designed for a high-dimensional
search space. Each simulated path through the game tree is selected
to optimize exploration in more auspicious regions of the search
space. One of the more interesting properties of MCTS is that it
guarantees to converge to optimal strategies for perfect-information
two-player zero-sum games [20]. MCTS is comprised of four main
components. The first component is a method for advancing the
game and is denoted by st+1 ← G(st ,at ). The second is a mecha-
nism for updating statistics for each visited node (i.e. game state).
The third component is an action selection method that is based on
statistics stored for visited tree nodes. The last component is the
rollout policy. The rollout policy is used to select actions when the
simulation encounters game states that are out of the scope of the
game tree. That is, a default strategy for selecting actions when there
is no tree node that corresponds to the game state in the search tree.
A detailed explanation of the Cheat Game MCTS representation is
presented later in the section The Cheat Game Agent.
For a given computational budget, MCTS performs multiple sim-
ulations. Each simulation starts at the initial game state and traverses
the game tree using the above action selection mechanisms. When a
simulation reaches a terminal state, the leaf node’s payoff is prop-
agated back to all visited nodes and the algorithm updates their
statistics. For each game state st the algorithm stores the following
statistics: N (s) denotes the number of times node s has been visited.
N (s,a) denotes the number of times action a was chosen when visit-
ing node s. Lastly, Q(s,a) denotes the aggregated discounted payoff
for performing action a at state s.
2.3 Determinization
Many MCTS variations were extended to imperfect information
games [3]. One of the more popular approaches performs the search
on a determinized instance of the game [2, 16, 31, 33]. An imperfect
information game can be converted into a perfect information game
(i.e. a deterministic game) by making the game states fully observ-
able by all players and fixing the outcomes of stochastic events. A
determinized MCTS algorithm performs simulations on the deter-
ministic game with perfect information. In order to obtain a strategy
for the full imperfect information game, the algorithm samples mul-
tiple determinized states that correspond to the current information
state, and for each action uniformly averages its discounted reward
(i.e. Q(s,a)). However, determinization techniques are susceptible to
several problems which prevent its convergence to Nash-Equilibrium
[23]. One of the more commonly reported problems is strategy fu-
sion [10]. Strategy fusion occurs when performing simulations of a
determinized perfect information game which relies on the assump-
tion that a player can perform distinct actions on multiple game
states. However, due to imperfect information, these game states
may be indistinguishable by the player and the error will be propa-
gated and distort the discounted reward estimations in earlier rounds.
Information set MCTS [6] is a MCTS variation that was developed
to address this problem.
2.4 Information Set MCTS
Information set MCTS (ISMCTS) [6] is a MCTS variation that per-
forms simulations directly on trees of information sets. Each node in
the tree represents an information set from the point of view of the
player and the statistics stored accordingly. However, when perform-
ing an online search, the algorithm is vulnerable to Non-Locality.
Non-locality occurs due to optimal payoffs not being recursively
defined over subgames as in perfect information games. As a result,
guarantees normally provided by search algorithms built on subgame
decomposition no longer hold. Online Outcome Sampling (OOS)
[22] is a variant of Monte Carlo counterfactual regret minimization
(MCCFR) [21]. It is the first MCTS approach that addresses these
problems by performing each simulation from the root state. While
OOS guarantees convergence to Nash equilibrium over time in all
two-player zero-sum games, other MCTS variations may yield better
performance in certain situations. Smooth-UCT [18] is a variant of
the established Upper Confidence Bounds Applied to Trees (UCT)
algorithm [20]. Similar to fictitious play, Smooth-UCT’s action selec-
tion mechanism is designed to mix a player’s average policy during
self-play. Smooth-UCT requires the same information as UCT (i.e.
node statistics). However, Smooth-UCT uses the average strategy by
utilizing the N (u,a) value. More specifically, Smooth-UCT chooses
the average strategy with probability ηk and the standard UCT ac-
tion with probability 1 − ηk , where ηk is an iteration sequence with
lim
k→∞
ηk = γ > 0. Smooth-UCT converges much faster than OOS
to a sub-optimal strategy and was only outperformed by OOS after
a significant number of simulated episodes [18]. This suggests that
for games with time constraints, Smooth-UCT outperforms better
than OOS . For this reason, Smooth-UCT was selected as the online
MCTS algorithm in the experiments. It is important to note that
the present technique is independent of the online MCTS variation
and can be extended to any Online Information set MCTS variation.
The section Smooth-UCT Calibration explores in detail the method
for calibrating the Smooth-UCT parameters that were used for the
experiments.
2.5 Related Work on Predicting Human Decisions
While many games have an optimal strategy for playing against
fully rational opponents, empirical studies suggest that people rarely
converge to the sub-game perfect equilibrium [9, 11]. However,
in many settings, it is still possible to develop a general human
decision-making model for predicting human decisions using data
collected from other people [27–29]. On the other hand, generalizing
computational agents’ decision-making without prior knowledge of
their computational model is significantly harder [8]. Therefore, an
integrative approach that incorporates prediction of a human oppo-
nent’s decision-making may yield better game performance when
interacting with an opponent for the first time, especially when deal-
ing with uncertainty and deceptiveness. By applying prediction of
human decision-making the agent adapts its actions to the human
player and can better plan its future actions [7, 12, 24, 29]. Facial
expressions were used for predicting people’s strategic decisions
in the Centipede-Game [25]. Key facial points were extracted from
video snippets of the players’ faces and were used to train a classifier
to predict participants’ decisions. [28] presented the Predictive and
Relevance based Heuristic agent (PRH), which can assist people in
argumentative discussions. The agent utilized a predictive model
with 76% accuracy of people’s top three arguments in conjunction
with a heuristic model. [17] introduced neural-based models that
learn a policy and the behavior of the opponents. An encoded obser-
vation of the opponent’s action is integrated into a deep Q-Network
(DQN). The presented methods outperform DQN in both a simulated
soccer game and a trivia game.
3 SEMI-DETERMINIZED MCTS
We introduce the Semi-Determinized MCTS (SDMCTS), a variant
of the Information Set MCTS algorithm (ISMCTS). SDMCTS uti-
lizes a predictive model of the unobservable portion of the human
opponent’s actions. First, SDMCTS searches for an optimal strategy
as a response to the opponent’s possible strategies in an instance of
the game where hidden actions are revealed to all players. Second,
SDMCTS uses the predictive model to estimate the expected reward
for each response action. More specifically, for a given computa-
tional budget, SDMCTS performs Monte Carlo simulations directly
on the information set of an instance of the game where only the
unobservable portion of the opponent’s actions are determined. That
is, during the simulations, SDMCTS considers all actions to be pub-
lic information and are revealed to all players while the remaining
private information is kept hidden. Formally, let uik be the informa-
tion state for player i at round k of the game. We denote by aok−1 the
action performed by an opponent in the previous round k − 1 which
led to the information state uik . Note that a
o
k−1 is not fully observable
by player i. Therefore, we define an alternative semi-determinized
information state u˜ik (aok−1) where the opponent’s previous action is
determined to be aok−1. During the search phase, SDMCTS performs
simulations on the semi-determinized information states, resulting
in estimates of Q(u˜ik (aok−1),a) for performing response action a at
the information state uik where the opponent’s previous action is
determined to be aok−1
1.
Once the search phase has been completed, the predictive model
is used for calculating the expected payoff for each of the current
player’s response actions. The predictive model provides a prob-
ability distribution over the opponent’s possible previous actions.
Formally, for a given information state ui , the predictive model esti-
mates P(ao | ui ), the probability that the opponent has performed
action ao in the previous round. The expected payoff Eu [ui ,a] for
performing action a at information state ui is calculated by:
Eu [ui ,a] =
∑
ao
(
P(ao | ui ) ·Q (u˜i (ao ),a) )
where Q(u˜i (ao ),a) is the estimated payoff for performing re-
sponse action a at the semi-determinized information state u˜i (ao ).
Lastly, the algorithm chooses the response action that maximizes
the expected payoff. Algorithm 1 presents a pseudo code of the pro-
posed method. In the algorithm, we denote by Qtr ee the estimated
payoff function that results from the SDMCTS simulations on the
semi-determinized instance of the game.
During the SEARCH, SDMCTS performs multiple ISMCTS sim-
ulations on the semi-determinized instance of the game. Algorithm 2
describes the standard ISMCTS simulation function. As described in
section 2.2, ISMCTS is comprised of the game simulator G and the
reward function R. In addition, OUT-OF-TREE keeps track of play-
ers who have left the scope of their search tree in the current iteration
(episode), i.e. the simulation has reached Information Set nodes that
were not explored before. When the simulation encounters a new
Information Set, one that was not visited in a/the previous episode,
the OUT-OF-TREE indicator is set to true and a new tree node is
created for the newly encountered Information Set. This operation is
performed by the EXPANDTREE function. The action selection and
node updating functions (i.e. SELECT and UPDATE) determine the
specific ISMCTS variant. The action selection function samples the
tree policy and chooses an action for the specified information set.
The update function is responsible for updating the tree nodes, i.e.
updating the information set statistics. The specific implementation
1The k and k − 1 notation are omitted in places where they can be deduced from the
context
Algorithm 1 Semi-Determinized ISMCTS
1: function SEARCH(ui )
2: while Within Computational Budget do
3: for each opponent’s action ao do
4: s0 ∼ I−1(u˜i (ao ))
5: SIMULATE(s0)
6: end for
7: end while
8: return Qtr ee
end function
9: function GET BEST RESPONSE(ui )
10: Qtr ee ← SEARCH (ui )
11: for each a ∈ A(ui ) do
12:
Eu [ui ,a] =
∑
ao
(
P(ao | ui ) ·Q (u˜i (ao ),a) )
13: return argmaxa∈A(u i ) Eu [ui ,a]
end function
of these functions is derived from the choice of the ISMCTS variant.
For the Cheat Game agent implementation which was used in the
experiments, the Smooth-UCT was used. The implementation of
the UPDATE and SELECT functions as well as the exact parame-
ters’ values that were used for the experiments are presented later in
section 4.6.
Algorithm 2 ISMCTS Simulation
1: function ROLLOUT(s)
2: a ∼ πr (s)
3: s ′ ∼ G(s,a)
4: return SIMULATE(s ′)
end function
5: function SIMULATE(s)
6: if ISTERMINAL(s) then
7: return r ∼ R(s)
end if
8: i = PLAYER(s)
9: if OUT-OF-TREE(i) then
10: return ROLLOUT(s)
end if
11: ui = Ii (s)
12: if ui < T i then
13: EXPANDTREE(T i ,ui )
14: a ∼ πr (s)
15: OUT-OF-TREE(i) ← true
16: else
17: a = SELECT (ui )
end if
18: s ′ ∼ G(s,a)
19: r ← SIMULATE(s ′)
20: UPDATE(ui ,a, r )
21: return r
end function
4 THE CHEAT GAME
The Cheat Game is an Imperfect Information Game with partially
unobservable actions. We use it for demonstration of our SDMCTS.
In addition, we believe it is an excellent game for studying Imperfect
Information scenarios and it is fun for people to play. We slightly
adapted the Cheat Game to fit playing online. In our version of the
Cheat Game, eight cards are dealt to each player at the onset of
the game. The first player is chosen randomly. Play proceeds in the
order of the deal. The objective of the game is to be the first player
to get rid of all of his cards. A turn consists of a player placing a
specific number (between one and four) of face-down cards in the
middle of the table and making a claim as to what those cards’ rank
is. However, a player is permitted to deceive his opponent and lie
about the cards’ rank; we call this claim a false claim. The first
claim of the game is chosen as the top card of the deck; subsequent
calls must be exactly one rank higher or one rank lower, with kings
being followed by aces. Lastly, if a player wishes to avoid making a
claim, he may Take a Card from the deck. Once a player has made a
claim, the opponent can challenge it by performing the Call-Cheat
action. If a claim is challenged, the entire stack of cards that were
placed onto the table are revealed and the claim is examined. If the
challenge was correct, the player who made the false claim must
take the entire stack of cards. However, if the challenger was wrong,
he must take the stack. The first player to empty their hand is the
winner. To further decrease the size of the search space, if the game
does not conclude after 100 rounds, the games ends and the winner
is the player who holds the lowest number of cards.
The Cheat Game is an imperfect information game where a player
cannot see his opponents’ cards. In addition, as described above, the
actual rank of a claim is not revealed to the other participants. In
other words, the actions of a player are hidden and often deceptive.
This property of the game adds a level of uncertainty and increases
the complexity of finding a suitable strategy.
4.1 The Cheat Game Agent
The Predictive MCTS Cheat Game Agent (PMCA) is an instantiation
of the proposed method presented in the Section Semi-Determinized
MCTS. More specifically, the PMCA combines a variation of the
MCTS algorithm with a predictive model of human decisions. As
mentioned above, the chosen MCTS adaptation is the well-established
Smooth-UCT [18]. The predictive model was developed based on
a human behavioral data-set. Prior to developing the agent, a pre-
liminary experiment was conducted. 60 participants were asked to
play the Cheat Game in a two-player repeated human-vs-human
experiment.
4.2 The Cheat Game - Information State
As defined above, an information state ui is the visible portion of
the game state s to player i. In the Cheat Game, the player is granted
access to the following attributes of the game state. Clearly, the
player can view his own cards and his own actions. In addition,
the player can view the number of cards in the opponent’s hand,
the facedown table cards, and the remaining cards in the shuffled
deck. Once a Call-Cheat action is performed, the last claim that
was made is examined. During the examination, all of the cards that
were placed facedown on the table are revealed to all of the players.
Therefore, a player can track cards that each player has collected
from the table.
4.3 The Cheat Game - Information State
Abstraction
An information state abstraction is a technique for significantly low-
ering the size of the state space. More specifically, an abstraction
aggregates similar information states, resulting in an alternative in-
formation space with a considerably smaller size [15, 19]. Formally,
an abstraction F = { f iA : Ui → U˜i |i ∈ N} is a set of functions
that maps the information state space Ui onto an information state
space U˜i , where |Ui | ≫ |U˜i |. While an abstraction is extremely
important for reducing the search space, it is not without flaws.
Aggregating similar information states prevents the players from dis-
tinguishing between the aggregated states and thus they may choose
a sub-optimal action. Therefore, it is important to choose a suitable
abstraction that both reduces state space and partially preserves its
strategic structure.
The abstraction calibration was planned carefully to balance be-
tween state space size and preserving the strategic structure of the
aggregated states. There is an inherent trade-off: as the search space
decreases, the probability of aggregating information states with
different strategies increases. Therefore, crucial attributes from the
full information state ui were selected based on their importance
when considering a strategy. Multiple sub-sets of attributes were
hand-picked by an experienced player and were tested extensively
against human players. The sub-set of attributes that performed best
was selected for the Cheat Game information state abstraction. It
is important to note that, as discussed above, during the search the
proposed method regards hidden actions as public information. That
is, the search is performed on the alternative information state where
claim actions are determinized, i.e. claims are considered as public
information and are revealed to all players. Therefore, the alterna-
tive information state contains public information about the nature
of the claim, i.e. whether the previous claim is a true claim or a
false claim. The information state abstraction is comprised of the
following attributes:
# Description Values
1 The opponent’s previous action.
TrueClaim,
FalseClaim,
TakeCard,
CallCheat
2&
3
Can the player make a one card
higher/lower true claim? True / False
4 The player’s card count. ψ {1, ..., 52}
5 The opponent’s card count. ψ {1, ..., 52}
6 Placed on table card count. ψ {1, ..., 52}
7 The round index. {1, ..., 100}
Whereψ (x) =

x , x ≤ 4
5, 5 ≤ x ≤ 8
6, otherwise
The remaining attributes require some additional explanation.
For the duration of the game, the agents keep track of which cards
were collected by the opponent when Call-Cheat was performed. In
this way, the agent can estimate which cards are currently held by
the opponent. In addition, the agents keep track of the opponent’s
claims. Some of the abstraction’s attributes are derived from these
estimations.
8 &
9
The estimated number of cards the
opponent has that are one rank
higher/lower from the last valid
claim.
φ{1, ..., 4}
10
&
11
A value indicating whether the cur-
rent player has made the same
higher/lower claim since the last
Call-Cheat move.
True / False
12
&
13
A value indicating whether the
opponent has made the same
higher/lower claim since the last
Call-Cheat move.
True / False
14
&
15
A value indicating whether the cur-
rent player was caught cheating on
a claim with one rank higher/lower
than the last claimed rank.
True / False
16
Did the opponent catch the player
cheating on any rank?
True / False
Where φ(x) =
{
x , if x ≤ 2
3, otherwise
4.3.1 Satisfying Time Restrictions. The time duration for
producing an action for the agents was determined from the average
time it took the participants to respond when they played head-to-
head human vs human. This value was determined to be 25 seconds.
In order to create an agent that can produce a response in reasonable
time, the MCTS tree nodes were optimized. While a naive represen-
tation of the described attributes takes 15 bytes in size, we were able
to encode all of the attributes into a 32-bit uint structure without data
loss (see Figure 1). This encoding was done for two reasons. First,
the encoding ensures a low memory footprint. Second, the use of a
32-bit uint is extremely suitable for hash-mapping structures. For a
large enough heap, it can significantly reduce the conflict when hash
retrieval is called and thereby improves CPU usage. In particular,
for the same amount of time, we were able to achieve a 12 fold
improvement in the number of simulations that can be performed.
Figure 1: Optimization - 32-bit Encoding
4.4 The Cheat Game - Action Abstraction
For a given game state s, a player may perform the following actions.
If the opponent made a claim during the previous state, the player
may choose to accuse the opponent of “cheating”, i.e. perform the
Call-Cheat action. Alternatively, a player may make his own claim.
As mentioned above, a claim can be either true or false. The player
may place up to four cards facedown on the table and make a claim
as to their rank. Lastly, if a player wishes to avoid making a claim,
he may Take a Card from the deck. Therefore, for a given game state
s, the number of actions a player may perform is:
|A(s)| = 2 +
4∑
k=1
(
h
k
)
where h is the number of cards in the player’s hand and k is the
number of cards he wishes to declare. The additional two actions
are for the Call-Cheat and Take a Card moves. Consequently, for
an average hand of eight cards, the branching factor will result in
164 unique actions. Combined with the 100 turn limit, the estimated
game tree may contain up to 10222 ≈ 164100 nodes. For this reason,
an action abstraction is introduced. A claim action is represented by
a tuple (γ ,δ ,k), where γ ∈ {hiдher , lower } denotes the direction of
the claim, δ ∈ {True, False} is a value indicating whether the claim
is true, and k is the number of cards that was declared. In return, the
branching factor is significantly reduced to a more computationally
manageable size, that is: |A(s)| = 2 + |{(γ ,δ ,k)}| = 18.
4.5 The Cheat Game - Rollout Policy
A range of unique heuristic based rollout policies were tested against
experienced human players. The rollout policy that performed best
against these experienced players was selected for the MCTS simu-
lations. The rollout policy, denoted by πr , was designed to mimic
the average strategic behavior of human players. To that end, the
human-vs-human data-set was used to extract a probability distri-
bution function (PDF) over the available actions. The probability
distribution function was combined with a set of heuristic rules
which were designed to handle special cases. The probabilities over
the set of action abstraction are presented in Figure 2. In cases
when one or more of the actions were inapplicable, the inapplicable
actions’ probability values were distributed uniformly among the
remaining actions. For example, if the previous action was not a
claim then the player was not allowed to perform the Call-Cheat
action. As a result, the remaining valid actions’ probabilities would
have increased by 0.006 = 0.105/17 each. Formally, let ui be an
information state and let Pr (a) be the fixed rollout probability for
choosing action a ∈ A(ui ), the normalized rollout probability for
choosing a in information state ui is calculated by:
πr (a | ui ) ∼ Pr (a)∑
ai ∈A(u i ) Pr (ai )
The special case heuristic was developed based on the expertise
of the human player. It is important to note that the heuristic rules
take precedence over the PDF. Therefore, if the current game state
satisfies any of the special case’s conditions, the heuristic action
is performed and the PDF action is ignored. The set of rules was
designed to reduce the chance that the rollout policy would perform
a dominated strategy. If the opponent made a false claim, the rollout
policy would choose the Call-Cheat action for the following cases:
a) If the opponent has no more cards in his hand; b) If there are
more than eight cards on the table; c) If the opponent was caught
cheating more than eight times; d) If the opponent made the same
claim since the last time Call-Cheat was performed; e) If the current
player’s cards contain a card with the same rank as the claim. f)
If the opponent was caught cheating on the same rank in previous
rounds.
Figure 2: Rollout Policy PDF over the action abstraction
4.6 Smooth-UCT Calibration
The Smooth-UCT mixes the average strategy with the Upper-Confidence
Bound (UCB) action selection mechanism. More specifically, Smooth-
UCT chooses with probability ηk the UCB action:
a = arдmaxaQ(ui ,a) + c ·
√
loдN (ui )
N (ui ,a)
where c is the balancing factor between exploration and exploitation.
Alternatively, Smooth-UCT chooses with a probability of 1 − ηk the
average strategy:
a ∼ p, where ∀a ∈ A(ui ) : p(a) ← N (u
i ,a)
N (ui )
.
The ηk is an iteration k-adapted sequence defined as:
ηk =max
(
γ ,η ·
(
1 + d · √Nk )−1)
where γ ,η and d are constants and Nk is the total visits to the corre-
sponding ui node. (The interested reader is referred to [18] for an
in-depth explanation of the parameters and their importance).
The η and γ parameters were manually calibrated and set to
η = 0.9,γ = 0.1. The d, c and payoff discount-factor parameters
were calibrated using a grid-search self-play tournament. Different
combinations of the parameters were competing in a head-to-head
tournament. Each game was comprised of 100 matches, the set of
parameters who won the majority of matches continued through
to the next level, while the loser was eliminated. The parameters’
settings were c = 17 + k , d = 0.001 + 0.005l and the discount-factor
= 0.97+ 0.005m where k, l ,m ∈ {1, ..., 10}. The winning parameters
set, c = 0.0025,d = 0.0025 and Discount Factor = 0.995, was used
in the experiment.
Algorithm 3 describes the action selection mechanism and update
functions used in Smooth-UCT. It is important to note that Smooth-
UCT uses the same UPDATE function as standard UCT.
4.7 Predictive Model
The predictive model was devised to classify the opponent’s ac-
tion type, i.e. true or f alse claim. As mentioned in Section The
Cheat Game Agent, a data-set of human-vs-human play of 60 par-
ticipants was collected in the preliminary experiment. The genders
Algorithm 3 Smooth-UCT - Select & Update
1: function SELECT(ui )
2: z ∼ U [0, 1]
3: if z < ηk (ui ) then
4: return arдmaxaQ(ui ,a) + c ·
√
loдN (u i )
N (u i ,a)
5: else
6: ∀a ∈ A(ui ) : p(a) ← N (u i ,a)N (u i )
7: return a ∼ p
end if
end function
8: function UPDATE(ui ,a, r )
9: N (ui ) ← N (ui ) + 1
10: N (ui ,a) ← N (ui ,a) + 1
11: Q(ui ,a) ← Q(ui ,a) + r−Q(u i ,a)N (u i ),a)
end function
were distributed evenly with 51% males and 49% females with ages
varying between 18-42. In total, the data-set contains 1,275 true
claim samples and 1,157 f alse claim samples. The data-set was used
to manually extract a collection of features. Customarily, different
subsets of features were tested on a wide range of binary classi-
fiers ranging from Decision Trees through Support Vector Machine
(SVM) [4] to Deep Neural Network (DNN) [30]. The evaluation of
the model was based on a âA˘IJleave-one-sample-outâA˘I˙ cross valida-
tion. For each sample for player i, round t and matchm, the classifier
was allowed to train on samples from all players excluding player i
and his opponent, as well as samples of player i and his opponent
that precede match m and round t . In order to avoid class imbal-
ance, oversampling was used in cases where the number of true and
f alse claim samples were significantly imbalanced. We were able to
achieve a good prediction rate with an Area Under the Curve (AUC)
of 0.821, TPR = 75.3%, TNR = 74.0% and G −Mean = 74.6% using
the Random Forest algorithm. The Deep Neural Network (DNN)
classifier received similar but slightly lower accuracy, however with
no significant difference. Figure 3a presents the Receiver Operat-
ing Characteristic (ROC) curves of the most accurate classifiers.
The final features collection contained 21 mostly statistical features.
The human player’ behavioural changes were modeled using these
predictive model’s features. The features contains information that
correspond to the number of rounds played. One of the more signifi-
cant features is the response duration. Another feature is the number
of times a player was caught cheating with respect to the number
of times he made a false claim until the last call cheat (i.e. #caught
/ #cheat). One more interesting feature is the number of times the
player took cards from the deck with respect to the number of rounds
played.
It is important to note that features2 were derived strictly from
data that is contained within the Information State.
5 EXPERIMENTS
Experiment were conducted in order to evaluate the effectiveness of
the proposed method. 120 participants from the US, aged 20-50 (46%
females and 54% males), were recruited using Amazon Mechanical
2For the complete feature list visit: https://goo.gl/VLy7NH
Turk. The participants were asked to play a two-player Cheat Game
for at least three matches but for no more than five matches. Prior
to the game, participants were presented with instructions followed
by a quiz which ensured that the rules were explained properly. The
participants received payment on a per match basis and an additional
payment for every match they won.
The objective of the experiment is to evaluate the effectiveness of
combining MCTS with a predictive model. To that end, participants
were randomly divided into three groups. Each group played against
a different instantiation of the proposed method (see Section Semi-
Determinized MCTS). As described above, the Smooth-UCT was
chosen as the MCTS algorithm. In the first group, the participants
played against a Smooth-UCT Cheat Game Agent (MGA) without a
predictive model. The agent gives equal probability to true and false
claims, i.e. P(ao = true claim | ui ) = P(ao = false claim | ui ) = 0.5
where ui is an information state for player i where the previous
opponent’s action, ao , is a claim action. Naturally, in information
states where the opponent’s previous action is not a claim (i.e. Take-
Card or CallCheat) these probabilities are set to zero. The second
group played against the Predictive Smooth-UCT Cheat Game Agent
(PMGA) that incorporates the predictive model from the Predictive
Model section. As described above, the predictive model was trained
on data collected from a preliminary experiment were the partici-
pants played human-vs-human cheat game. It is important to note the
preliminary experiment’s subjects did not participate in the agents’
evaluation experiments. In order to further demonstrate the effec-
tiveness of combining a predictive model with MCTS, participants
in the third group played against the FPMGA agent, which had an
unfair advantage. The FPMGA agent was allowed to peek into his
opponent’s real claim. Therefore, participants in the third group were
compensated due to this unfair advantage. While the FPMGA agent
was able to predicate the opponent’s claim with perfect precision
(i.e. 100% prediction rate), it was restricted to a prediction rate of
85%. The 85% prediction rate was chosen as a plausible prediction
rate that can be achieved when predicting human decisions. A higher
prediction rate (above 85%) is extremely difficult to obtain when in-
teracting with people. This is in part because of the inherent noise in
the human decision-making process. For example, the same person
may choose a different strategy in the same exact game state. For the
experiments, we hypothesize that the FPMGA agent will outperform
the PMGA agent and that both predictive agents will outperform the
non-predictive agent, MGA.
5.1 Experimental Results
To analyze the results, one-way ANOVA was conducted to compare
the three conditions (p < .05). The exact p-value and f -ratio can
be observed in the figures. As can be seen in Figure 3, both the
predictive agent (PMGA) and the pseudo predictive agent (FPMGA)
performed significantly better than the non-predictive agent (MGA).
Furthermore, FPMGA performed significantly better than PMGA.
Figure 3b presents the percentage of won matches by the agents (i.e.
won/played). This can be explained by the successful call cheat ratio
that can be viewed in Figure 3c. The results suggest that by com-
bining the predictive model with the Smooth-UCT, the agents were
able to reduce the uncertainty that was derived from hidden action.
Thereby, the predictive agents were able to choose better response
(a) ROC Curves
(b) Agents’ matches win ratio (c) Call Cheat Success Rate (d) Matches’ Avg. Rounds
Figure 3: Predictive Model & Experimental results.
actions to deceptive claims. Figure 3d can further demonstrate the
improvement of game performance. The average number of rounds it
took the predictive agents to conclude a match is significantly lower
than the non-predictive agent. Interestingly, the average number of
rounds it took the FPMGA to conclude a match is higher than the
PMGA, despite FPMGA having a more accurate prediction rate. We
hypothesize that this is due to fact that the FPMGA performs the
call cheat action more than the PMGA and MGA. This prolongs the
number of rounds needed to reach a terminal state. However, the
MCTS’s discount factor can be calibrated in order to incentivize the
agents to conclude the games faster.
Another measure for play-dominance is the average difference be-
tween the cards held by the agent and the humans. The PMGA’s and
FPMGA’s average card difference (−3.51 and −4.56, respectively)
was significantly lower than MGA’s (−2.89), with an f -ratio of 6.06
and a p-value of .002. The importance of the statistically significant
results is enhanced when considering the low number of matches in
the experiments.
In addition to the statistically significant results, we offer as a
discussion the human participants’ behavioral statistics. It seems
that people played differently against the different agents. Unfortu-
nately, statistical significance of such behaviour was not obtained.
We hypothesize that this is because of the inherent noise in human
behavior. For example, people who played against the predictive
agents demonstrate a reduction in performing false claims. More
specifically, 40.4% and 42.4% of all people’s claims were false when
played against FPMGA and PMGA, respectively, while people who
played against MGA lied more with a 44.8% false claim ratio. This
can be explained by the fact that people tend to lie less when there
is a high chance of being caught. On the other hand, people who
played against MGA took less cards from the deck, i.e. chose to
Take-Card for 23.9% of the moves, while people who played against
the FPMGA and PMGA performed the Take-Card action in 19.6%
and 20.8% of moves, respectively. This is unexpected, as one would
expect people to take a card from the deck in order to avoid making
a false claim. Another important observation is that people who
played against MGA perform better in later matches, that is, people
won 13% of the first two matches and 28% of the last two matches.
However, people who played against PMGA and FPMGA performed
in a similar fashion across all matches, contributing to the overall
success of the prediction-based methods.
6 CONCLUSION
We have presented an algorithm for the development of agents that
performs well against human in Imperfect Information Games with
Partially Observable Actions. More specifically, we have introduced
Semi-Determinized MCTS (SDMCTS), an ISMCTS algorithm that
combines a predictive model of the opponent’s actions and an infor-
mation set MCTS variant. The method builds on existing ISMCTS
adaptations and determinization techniques, and takes advantage
of the benefits of both approaches. We have presented the Cheat
Game as an indicative example of the effectiveness of the presented
techniques. In addition, a predictive model was conferred and pro-
duced good accuracy for predicting human strategic decision-making
in the Cheat Game. We have presented the MGA, PMGA and FP-
MGA agents which applied the SDMCTS algorithm to the Cheat
Game. The SDMCTS agents combined the predictive model with
the Smooth-UCT, a ISMCTS variation, to yield skillful performance
when used in a head-to-head game with human opponents. The
results of an extensive experiment with 120 participants were pre-
sented. The participants played repeated head-to-head games against
the MGA, PMGA and FPMGA agents. The results suggest that the
combination of a predictive model with MCTS can be used to im-
prove game performance against humans. Furthermore, the agents’
performance improved as the predictive model’s accuracy increases.
For future work, we intend to combine an additional predictive
model of the opponent’s response strategy in the Cheat Game. More
specifically, we will develop a predictive model that estimates the
probability that the opponent will Call Cheat at a claim. In addition,
we intend to implement the SDMCTS algorithm for two-player poker
and develop a predictive model that estimates the strength of the
opponent’s hand compared to ours. Lastly, we intend to implement
our method on Phantom games.
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